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Abstract
An 8.8 mega-earthquake hit the coast of Chile on February 27th, 2010 and is recorded as one of the
largest earthquakes to date. Despite the magnitude of the earthquake, Chile suffered relatively little
casualty rates and property damages. To analyze the impact of the earthquake even further, stock trends,
bond market fluctuation, government credit ratings and personal anecdotes were factored and compared
against other similar mega-earthquake incidents, notably one in Japan on March 11th, 2011 and another
in New Zealand on February 22nd, 2011. While Japan and New Zealand both slipped in their government
ratings and stock markets following the earthquakes, Chile’s market – both the stock market and the
government ratings – have actually increased following the mega-earthquake. Reconstruction spending,
low fatality rate, and notably, the country’s deep understanding of earthquake response procedures
attributed to the nation’s financial resiliency and quick recovery. Several interviews with government
officials, NGO leaders and government officials were conducted to reveal unique leadership
characteristics and management techniques applied during the mega-earthquake in order to provide
insight beyond numbers.
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CHILE EARTHQUAKE \

2.27.2010

STORIES & LESSONS

Richard Jungwoo Hong
University of Pennsylvania | Social Impact Research Experience | Jan 2014

+ ABSTRACT
An 8.8 mega-earthquake hit the coast of Chile on February 27th, 2010 and is recorded as one of the
largest earthquakes to date. Despite the magnitude of the earthquake, Chile suffered relatively little
casualty rates and property damages. To analyze the impact of the earthquake even further, stock
trends, bond market fluctuation, government credit ratings and personal anecdotes were factored and
compared against other similar mega-earthquake incidents, notably one in Japan on March 11th, 2011
and another in New Zealand on February 22nd, 2011. While Japan and New Zealand both slipped in their
government ratings and stock markets following the earthquakes, Chile’s market – both the stock
market and the government ratings – have actually increased following the mega-earthquake.
Reconstruction spending, low fatality rate, and notably, the country’s deep understanding of earthquake
response procedures attributed to the nation’s financial resiliency and quick recovery. Several
interviews with government officials, NGO leaders and government officials were conducted to reveal
unique leadership characteristics and management techniques applied during the mega-earthquake in
order to provide insight beyond numbers.

+ INTRODUCTION \ purpose
The purpose of this research proposal is to characterize the decisions that the Chilean
organizations – both the government and the NGOs - took in response to the massive Maule earthquake
that occurred on February 27th, 2010. An international research team – comprising of 3 investigators
from the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania, four investigators from Catholic University
and Vertical S.A., and a senior staff member of the World Economic Forum – have created a book/report
in an attempt to understand Chile’s leadership during the 2010 super-earthquake, correct procedures,
and lessons other countries can learn from their successful strategies.

+ INTRODUCTION \ methodology
There are several methodologies to analyze what happened in Chile:
-

Analyze the building codes and whether those codes are enforced for regulation purposes.

-

Calculate how insured is Chile – both on corporate and consumer level – for natural disasters
like the earthquake.

-

Do citizens know about earthquake and tsunami risks? Do they understand the procedure if
such disaster strikes?

-

Analyze amount of financial damage that could be averted if disaster preventions were done
correctly.

-

Interview government officials, current administration’s cabinet, and other leaders who were
responsible for Chile’s swift recovery. President Piñera’s cabinet is listed in Appendix 5.

+ THE EARTHQUAKE \ detail
Shortly after the massive earthquake in Haiti on January 12th, 2010, a super-earthquake (8.8 on
the magnitude scale versus 7.0 for Haiti) rocked the Chilean for approximately three minutes. The
earthquake was powerful enough (roughly 500 times greater than the Haitian earthquake) to claim itself
as the 6th greatest earthquake ever recorded – just behind Japan’s 9.0 earthquake that resulted in
15,000 deaths from tsunamis and debris. The damages done to Chile are shown in Appendix 1.
Although Chile underwent a staggering loss of 17% of the country’s GDP, information following the
mega-earthquake only reported 525 deaths. To put the number in perspective, the chart shown in
Appendix 2 compares Chile’s low fatality rate compared to other countries that were hit by earthquakes.
However, the majority of Chile’s electrical grid was shut down within minutes of the earthquake, and
more than 90 percent of the public were subject to faulty telephone lines, irresponsive cellular towers
and lack of internet services. In addition to the absence of communication, “The earthquake and
tsunami displaced 800,000 people from their homes, and two million experienced at least some
residential breakage” 1
0F
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However, Chile’s recovery was swift and sound. 3000 schools that were shut down initially in Chile

were all reopened within a month of the earthquake. Financially, Chile’s annual GDP growth turned
negative initially during the earthquake, but by
2011, the country’s annual growth was back to 5+
percent rate.
Goldman Sachs economist Alberto Ramos said
the following:
“In all, the earthquake will impact the economy
during the first half 2010, but significant policy
flexibility, institutional credibility and the
resilience accumulated in recent years should
assist Chile in overcoming this tragedy.” 3
2F
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Kunreuther, Michel-Kerjan, Useem. First Order of Business. 2014.
Source: International Monetary Fund, Chile, 2011 Article IV Consultation, 2011, p. 17; IMACEC is a monthly GDP proxy for Chile.
Jude Webber, “Economic Tremors Unlikely to be Felt in the Long Term,” Financial Times, March 1, 2010

An assessment team from International Monetary Fund concluded similarly:
“Chile’s economy has recovered rapidly from the global financial crisis and the February 2010
earthquake. Its resilience was underpinned by solid policy frameworks (including a fiscal rule, inflation
targeting and exchange rate flexibility), a sound banking system and a strong policy response, facilitated
by the existence of large fiscal buffers.”
Data collected from the past several decades would heavily suggest that natural disasters are impossible
to stop and unnatural disasters are impossible to predict. Human setbacks, however, are predictable,
and their scale depends much upon the decisions of those who lead 4 . The mission is to analyze what
Chile has done correctly – from both Bachelet and Piñera administrations in Chile – to help other
countries avoid unforeseen disasters.

+ THE EARTHQUAKE \ government response
A major political change was being implemented to the Chilean government at the time of the
earthquake. When the earthquake struck, the government was not only changing the presidency (from
Michelle Bachelet to Sebestian Piñera) but also involved a change in the political stance (from Leftist
government to Central-Right). This political change also happened at the Senate level, and many
government officials in each region were changed days before the earthquake struck.
Given the recent political change, the government was relatively slow to act. Other than basic policing to
control order, it took them almost 2 weeks to properly respond to the disaster relief with military
presence and supplies 5. In fact, Aldo Boitano at Vertical S.A. stated that Bachelet did not immediately
call the National Guard to help with the disaster relief effort, a move later heavily criticized during her
2013 Presidential campaign. In addition, she even initially stated to other countries that Chile did not
need any help, which she later corrected.
However, the majority of the heavy duty rescue plan fell on the shoulders of the president-elect,
Sebestian Piñera. His first response to the earthquake was very simple and defining: “Clear leadership
that explained to the people, short and easy, what happened to the country, not just what is happening
to them but also what is happening to the other people. People want to know what happened to the

4
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USGS and American Red Cross, p. 1
Appendix 7 – Interview with Aldo Boitano, Veritcal S.A.

rest of the country.” 6 However, the president-elect defined more plans for immediate recovery,
mandating to restore absolute necessity such as civil order, water and electricity.
Unlike United States where the general population expects the government – both the state and federal
– to be the sole response to a disaster, Chileans expect the NGOs to contribute to the relief efforts as
well.

+ THE EARTHQUAKE \ role of NGOs
Based on the interviews conducted with Aldo Boitano at Vertical S.A. in Santiago (Appendix 7), the role
of NGOs is significantly different in Chile than those in United States. The primary role of an NGO is to
console the community when a disaster strikes. In most cases, the NGOs are made up of professionals
from the community, appointed political officials and experts who are knowledgeable about disaster
prevention techniques.
Especially because the population in Chile has a general distrust towards the central government, the
NGOs are better suited for restoring order, consoling those struck by the disaster, and understanding
precisely what the community needs in order to bounce back from the disaster. However, it is the
combination of NGO’s ability to understand the community’s needs and government’s resources/order
that truly defined Chile’s remarkable recovery.
According to Aldo, NGOs were the first ones to respond to the disaster. Their first task was to relieve the
community, help individuals find their relatives, and start communicating with the government in
Santiago. The NGOs, teamed with professionals and utility companies, planned for 1.5 months on how
to re-insure the public, and methods to continually keep food, water and electricity running in areas
without power.
However, not everything was smooth sailing. For example, some workers were only volunteering to
fetch a job from the government-funded housing reconstruction projects. In addition, Aldo states that
“help from Santiago contributed more to the problem than solving it”, referring to volunteers from
Santiago more interested in taking photos of the aftermath rather than actually providing valuable
resources for the earthquake-struck community.

6

Kunreuther, Michel-Kerjan, Useem. First Order of Business. 2014.

+ THE EARTHQUAKE \ leadership & management
The world was recovering from the 2008-2009 global financial crises and the Chilean economy was not
exempt from the hindrances of the Great Recession. When the disaster struck, “The rate of growth was
very low. The job creation capacity was very low. The unemployment rate was very high. The
investment rate as a percent of GNP was falling down. Productivity was negative. Poverty was
increasing.” 7
To make the matter even worse, Chile received the lowest amount of donations/funding internationally
in comparison to the other earthquake-hit countries. 8
Haiti
Jan. 12, 2010
7.0
223,000
8.1
117%

Chile
Feb. 27, 2010
8.8
533
30
18%

Japan
Mar. 11, 2011
9.0
15,883
309
5.6%

New Zealand
Feb. 22, 2011
6.3
181
15
10.5%

107,812

16,297

260,417

60,417

Pre-event
Population (millions)
GDP per Capita (PPP)
Population Below Poverty Line (%)

9.0
$1,338
80

17.1
$14,340
18

128.1
$35,500
16

4.3
$28,400
15

Funding relief and reconstruction ($ bil.)
National government
Insurers
Foreign aid, including cash, in-kind, and pledges
Governments and multinational agencies
Private individuals and organizations

950
108
4,052
2,941
1,111

9,000
8,000
125
51
74

198,000
35,000
17,100
12,500
4,600

8,500
12,000
2,668
971
1,697

Earthquake Event
Magnitude (Mw)
Estimated deaths
Economic damage in $ billions
Economic damage as percent of GDP
Pace of incoming international aid during the
first four days ($/hour)

With the NGOs given a heavy work load of relieving the earthquake-struck community on the front-end,
the government was defining the tone of the nation:
“First, Piñera insisted that his campaign goals of economic growth and job creation would not be
compromised. Second, he required that his government think strategically and act deliberatively so that
the nation’s comeback would go well beyond its existing condition at the time of the event. Third, he
7
8
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insisted that all of the reconstruction be guided and constrained by the nation’s traditions and values.
And fourth, he averred that the restoration would come as completely and quickly as possible, and that
all of it was to be completed by his exit on March 11, 2014.”

During the interview, Aldo stated that the biggest threat in the modern era is not shortage of water or
food but rather a lack of communication. With irresponsive cell phone towers and a lack of electricity,
regular cell phones could not be utilized. It is not necessarily the dearth of communication that strikes
fear in us, but more the absence of something so fundamental that we have in our daily lives. Only a few
who were equipped with specially motorized cellular devices by the military had access to
communication. Aldo details that “when we arrived at the scene, the first thing people wanted was a
working phone” in order to call and locate their loved ones.
The swift and extensive assurance of the public was a distinctive factor of the Chilean recovery. It is
difficult for the federal government to be cognizant of all incidents, and a bridge between the local
community – represented by the NGOs – and the government needs to be present. The NGOs alone
could not have had the power to restore order while the government alone would not have understood
the direct needs of the public.

+ THE EARTHQUAKE \ recovery
The key defining reasons behind Chile’s swift recovery were “a history of earthquakes, a well-enforced
building code, and a provision that holds builders liable for their building’s durability for a decade”,
which all contributed to a surprising low casualty rate. However, their swift financial recovery, which is
analyzed extensively in the following sections, can also be attributed to their indebtedness and lack of
international borrowing prior to the earthquake.
Aldo states that most Chileans have property insurance and health insurance. The government was also
able to gain swift influx of capital from private insurers backed by international reinsurers. In fact, “a
third of the cost of Chile’s recovery was borne entirely by private insurers” 9. The importance of
insurance should be depicted as a significant factor to countries in similar geography.
In addition, there were other key techniques that both the NGOs and the government took to expedite
the recovery process:
9
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- 200,000 houses were funded by the government to be re-constructed or constructed.
- 3000 schools were to be repaired and all were re-opened within 6 months
- Government spending increased economic activity, raising national credit ratings
- National Emergency Center opened for 24/7 instead of 40 hours a week
- Building codes were re-checked in areas hit by disaster to avoid future building from collapsing
- To avoid heavy traffic in hospitals, some hospitals used “reverse triage” – sending “least-ill patients
to their homes with medications, instructions and the promise of home-visits by hospital staff”. 10
- The government purchased the entire stock of local supermarkets at prevailing prices to make sure
that the local community received essentials and supermarkets were not taking advantage of

the situation by setting the prices at an unfairlevel.

10
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+ AFTERMATH COMPARISON \ stocks
When earthquake strikes, most of the attention is initially focused towards fatality and direct financial
damages. However, the stock index – often the best representation of a country's financial status – also
takes a huge hit from the calamity. Let’s look at 3 different mega-earthquakes in the past decade:

Indian Ocean Earthquake and Tsunami
December 26th, 2004

11

During the Indian Earthquake/Tsunami – December 26th, 2004 – the stock index NSEI (biggest index in
India) took a slight hit (roughly from 2.1 K to 1.9K, nearly 10% drop). However, the drop isn't as
significant as the Japanese earthquake which resulted in nearly 20% drop even though the fatality rate
and the overall financial damages were far greater in the Indian Earthquake.

11

http://in.finance.yahoo.com/echarts?s=%5ENSEI#symbol=%5Ensei;range=20040101,20051201;compare=;indicator=volume;ch
arttype=area;crosshair=on;ohlcvalues=0;logscale=off;source=undefined;

Japanese Tohoku Earthquake and Tsunami
March 11th, 2011

12

During the Japanese Earthquake/Tsunami – March 11th, 2011 – the Nikkei 225 index incurred an
enormous drop (roughly from 10.5 K to 8.6K, nearly 20%) within a matter of weeks. In addition, FTSE
100 index – the London exchange – “lost £47 billion of its value in London as it shed more than 180
points in early trading.” In addition, the oil prices dropped sharply as investors predicted that a renewed
recession in Japan would take a toll on its demand. 13

12

http://finance.yahoo.com/echarts?s=%5EN225+Interactive#symbol=%5En225;range=20091230,20111230;compare=;indicator=
volume;charttype=area;crosshair=on;ohlcvalues=0;logscale=off;source=undefined
13
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1366676/Japan-tsunami-Global-stock-markets-tumble-amid-fears-nucleardisaster.html

Chile Earthquake
February 27th, 2010

14

When the Chile earthquake struck – February 27th, 2010 – the IGPA (stock index that tracks most of
stocks in the Santiago exchange – did not budge. Compared to the Japanese Earthquake (which resulted
in a 20% drop) and the Indian Earthquake (which resulted in a 10% drop), the Chilean earthquake –
partly due to extremely low fatality and swift recovery – did not pose any financial threat to the stock
market.

14

http://www.tradingeconomics.com/chile/stock-market

+ AFTERMATH COMPARISON \ bonds
Stock exchanges are an accurate measurement of the initial impact of the disaster. However, fixed
income can be implemented to measure the overall healthiness of the nation’s financial landscape postearthquake. Especially because earthquakes can disrupt supply chain, daily operations, office buildings
and general business models, some corporations might look to default on their next payment, driving
the bond prices down. Here, we break down the bond indices of two countries: Japan and Chile.

Japanese Earthquake
As we can observe from the graph below, the Japanese Investment Grade Corporate Bond Index (BJPY)
dipped significant following the earthquake. In addition to the country’s general credit rating
downgraded, investors flocked away from the Japanese bond market.

Chile Earthquake
As indicated from below, there was only a slight dip in the DJones LA Tixx Chile government Peso Bond
Index following the earthquake. The slight drop indicates that the investors are more convinced of the
nation’s financial healthiness in comparison to Japan’s steep decline.

+ AFTERMATH COMPARISON \ government
Stocks and bonds are good measurement for financial resiliency of given country to disasters. However,
another interesting metric is to observe the credit ratings of each government. We analyze three recent
earthquakes: one in Japan, one in New Zealand, and of course, the one in Chile.

EFFECT ON RATINGS \ NEW ZEALAND \ 2.22.2011 \ 6.3 Mw \ $40 Bil. Loss
Feb.2011

Earthquake of 6.3 magnitude has hit New Zealand.

Sep.2011
The outlook is stable after the long-term local-currency rating was reduced one level to
AA+ and foreign-currency debt was cut to AA from AA+, S&P said in a statement. New
Zealand’s dollar extended its biggest quarterly drop since 2008 after Fitch announced
similar moves yesterday. Both credit assessors cited concern that government and
household debt is expanding. 15

Sep.2011
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services and Fitch Ratings both downgraded New Zealand's
government debt Friday, citing its worsening external-debt position and the costs of
earthquake recovery. The ratings companies, acting less than nine hours apart, cut their
long-term foreign-currency ratings to AA from AA-plus and the local-currency ratings to
AA-plus from AAA, with stable outlooks. 16

15
16

http://www.businessweek.com/news/2011-09-30/new-zealand-yields-surge-as-ratings-cut-by-s-p-fitch.html
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204226204576601601469975690.html

EFFECT ON RATINGS \ JAPAN \ 3.11.2011 \ 9.0 Mw \ $235 Bil. Loss
Mar.2011

Earthquake of 9.0 magnitude has hit Japan.

April.2011

Standard and Poor's threatened to cut Japan's sovereign credit rating again, warning the
huge cost of last month's devastating earthquake will hurt already weak public finances
unless bickering politicians can agree to raise taxes. It affirmed its long-term sovereign
credit rating on Japan at AA minus -- the lowest among the major agencies -- but
downgraded the outlook to negative from stable. Public debt, already twice the size of
the $5 trillion economy, is set to swell as the country faces reconstruction costs
following the March 11 earthquake and tsunami that could reach 50 trillion yen ($613
billion), S&P said. 17

May.2011

Moody's warned on Tuesday that the devastation that struck Japan nearly three months
ago is making it even harder for the country to recover from the financial crisis. It put
Japan's Aa2 rating – the rating agency's third-highest grade – on review for a possible
downgrade, adding that there was a "low chance" of a multi-notch downgrade. 18

Aug.2011

Moody’s, the credit ratings agency, lowered Japan’s credit rating by one notch on
Wednesday, warning that frequent changes in administration, weak prospects for
economic growth and its recent natural and nuclear disasters made it difficult for the
government to pare down its huge debt. 19

May.2012

17

Fitch said it was cutting the sovereign rating to A-plus, putting it on a par with Estonia
and Malta, and below the local currency ratings for Asian rivals China and Korea. The
firm's action lowers the double-A long-term foreign-currency rating and the double-Aminus local currency issuer default rating to the new A-plus level. 20

http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/04/27/us-japan-economy-rating-idUSTRE73Q0J920110427
http://www.theguardian.com/business/2011/may/31/japan-unemployment-credit-rating-threat
19
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/24/business/global/japans-credit-rating-cut-by-moodys.html?_r=0
20
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303610504577419700029425564.html
18

EFFECT ON RATINGS \ CHILE \ 2.27.2010 \ 8.8 Mw \ $15 to $30 Bil. Loss
Feb.2010
Jun.2010

Jul.2010

Dec.2010

Feb.2011

Dec.2012

21

Earthquake of 8.8 magnitudes has hit the central coast of Chile.
In June 2010, Moody's upgraded Chile's credit rating to Aa3 from A1 with positive outlook
because “The upgrade reflected the country's demonstrated economic and financial
resilience even in the face of major adverse shocks, including February's historic
earthquake” 21
Chile's government recently launched a $1.5 billion bond issuance, in both local and foreign
currency, in the international capital markets. The government's plan to issue this debt was
made public months ago, and is fully incorporated in Chile's ratings. Chile's foreign and local
currency government bond ratings were upgraded to Aa3 on June 16 2010. The upgrade
reflected the country's demonstrated economic and financial resilience even in the face of
major adverse shocks, including February's historic earthquake. The government's strong
fiscal position and favorable debt profile, including the expected upcoming debt issuance,
also supported the upgrade. 22
In December 2010, Standard & Poor’s revised the outlook to positive because “Chile's
strong financial profile, growing economic stability, and good growth prospects support the
positive outlook”. Previously, in December 2007, Standard & Poor’s upgraded Chile’s credit
rating to A+ from A with stable outlook, lauding the strength of its economy and saying its
economy was “more resilient than ever". 23
In February 2011, Fitch upgraded Chile's credit rating to A+ from A with stable outlook
because features of Chilean economy “have allowed Chile to remain very resilient despite
the two severe shocks emanating from the global credit crisis and the 2010 devastating
earthquake. 24

In December 2012, Moody's upgraded Chile's credit rating to Aa3 from A1 with stable
outlook, to reflect the resilience of the economy to external shocks, including the 2012
earthquake. In addition, it considered the solid fiscal position and the favorable debt
profile. 25

http://www.hacienda.cl/english/investor-relations-office/why-chile.html
http://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-says-Chiles-ratings-remain-stable-after-15b-bond-issuance?docid=PR_203197
23
http://www.hacienda.cl/english/investor-relations-office/why-chile.html
24
http://www.hacienda.cl/english/investor-relations-office/why-chile.html
25
http://www.hacienda.cl/english/investor-relations-office/why-chile.html
22

EFFECT ON RATINGS \ COMPARISON TIMELINE

CHILE

A+

A1

A+

JAPAN

AA-

Aa2

A+

NEW
ZEALAND

AA

N/A

AA

Red \Downgraded
Green \ Upgraded

+ ADDITIONAL INFORMATION \ appendix
APPENDIX \ 1
Impact
Airports damaged
Ports and fishing coves destroyed
Hospitals damaged or destroyed
Bridges severely damaged or
destroyed
Km. of coastline devastated
Km. of roadways severely damaged
Schools damaged
Public housing units damaged
Homes destroyed
Homes severely damaged
Homeless residents
School students displaced

Number

630
1,554
4,538
8,000
81,400
109,000
800,000
1.2 million

Municipalities impacted
Health organizations impacted
Population impacted

69 percent
75 percent
81 percent

Estimated cost (17 percent of GDP)

$30 billion

8
30
40
210

Source: Ministry of Housing and Urban Development,
Reconstruction Program, 2012; Hernán de Solminihac, 2012.
Note: Figures are estimates.

APPENDIX \ 2
Location
Valdivia, Chile
Prince William Sound, Alaska
Andreanof Islands, Aleutian Islands, Alaska
Off the coast of Tōhoku, Japan
Kamchatka, Russia
Off the western coast of Sumatra, Indonesia
Off the coast of Ecuador
Off the Maule region, Chile
Rat Islands, Aleutian Islands, Alaska
Northern Sumatra, Indonesia

Date
May 22, 1960
March 28, 1964
March 9, 1957
March 11, 2011
Nov. 4, 1952
Dec. 26, 2004
Jan. 31, 1906
Feb. 27, 2010
Feb. 4, 1965
March 28, 2005

Source: http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0763403.html#ixzz2A93tHXQO

Moment
Magnitude
9.5
9.2
9.1
9.0
9.0
9.0
8.8
8.8
8.7
8.7

Estimated
Fatalities
5,700
125
0
15,870
Unknown
230,000+
1,000
523
Unknown
1,303

APPENDIX \ 3
Rank Country
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

Vanuatu
Tonga
Philippines
Japan
Costa Rica
Brunei
Darussalam
Mauritius
Guatemala
El Salvador
Bangladesh
Chile
Netherlands
Solomon Islands
Fiji
Cambodia

Risk
%
64
55
53
46
43
41
37
36
33
32
31
31
30
28
28

Source: United Nations University Institute for Environment
and Human Security and The Nature Conservancy, with
Alliance Development Works, World Risk Report, 2012.
Risk exposure percentage is defined by the fraction of the
population that is exposed to natural hazards, including
earthquakes, cyclones, flooding, drought, or rising sea-levels.

APPENDIX \ 4

Rank

Country

Expert
Sample

Risk
Management
Question
score

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Singapore
Qatar
Oman
United Arab Emirates
Canada
Sweden
Saudi Arabia
New Zealand
Finland
Chile

171
113
75
163
101
76
94
52
36
78

6.08
6.01
5.55
5.47
5.41
5.41
5.41
5.40
5.32
5.20

0.11
0.18
0.26
0.17
0.20
0.28
0.29
0.24
0.43
0.29

17
18
19
20

Germany
Turkey
Switzerland
United Kingdom

127
84
77
102

4.90
4.83
4.82
4.81

0.25
0.28
0.32
0.28

Margin of
error

29
30
31
32

United States
China
France
Australia

390
369
128
67

4.53
4.51
4.51
4.49

0.14
0.13
0.27
0.41

38
39
45

India
Italy
Brazil

119
86
141

4.31
4.24
4.16

0.27
0.32
0.23

67

Japan

111

3.67

0.28

138
139

Argentina
Venezuela

96
38

2.08
1.68

0.25
0.28

Source: World Economic Forum Executive Opinion Survey (question x.xx), “How would you assess your national
government's overall risk management effectiveness of monitoring, preparing for, responding to and mitigating
against major global risks (e.g., financial crisis, natural disasters, climate change, pandemics, etc.)? Scale: 1 = not
effective in managing major global risks; 7 = effective in managing major global risks.” World Economic Forum,
National Competitiveness, Geneva, Switzerland, World Economic Forum, 2013.

APPENDIX \ 5
Office
Interior
Foreign Affairs
Defense
Finance
Secy. Gen. of Presidency
Secy. Gen. of Government
Economy
Planning
Education

Justice
Labor
Public Works
Health
Housing & Urbanism

Name
Rodrigo Hinzpeter
Alfredo Moreno
Jaime Ravinet
Andrés Allamand
Felipe Larraín
Cristián Larroulet
Ena von Baer
Andrés Chadwick
Juan Andrés Fontaine
Pablo Longueira
Felipe Kast
Joaquín Lavín
Joaquín Lavín
Felipe Bulnes
Harald Beyer
Felipe Bulnes
Teodoro Ribera
Camila Merino
Evelyn Matthei
Hernán de Solminihac
Laurence Golborne
Jaime Mañalich
Magdalena Matte
Rodrigo Pérez

Agriculture
Mining
Transport & Telecom
National Assets
Energy

Women
Culture & the Arts
Environment

José Antonio Galilea
Luis Mayol
Laurence Golborne
Hernán de Solminihac
Felipe Morandé
Pedro Pablo Errázuriz
Catalina Parot
Ricardo Raineri
Laurence Golborne
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APPENDIX \ 7
Ricky: What was disaster prevention process like?
Aldo: There was such a lack of leadership that President Bachelet appointed presidential delegates in
each region as the “intendente”, most important political figure in the region. Bachelet appointed the
people only for 4 days since she was leaving the office. Apparently, the man in charge of the largest
police station in the area [Region 7] was crying because he was overwhelmed by the situation. People
were starting to rob supermarkets, fighting in the streets and they didn’t know what to do. Due to that,
NGOs organized electric companies, water companies, important political figure, etc. for 1.5 months and
they all used pen and paper because there were no phones at the time.
Ricky: What was the general feeling towards the government?
Aldo: There were a lot of resentment towards the central government and political figures because they
more or less abandoned them.
Ricky: Do you think if the earthquake were to happen right now where there are no transitions between
the two presidents [Bachelet & Piñera], the situation would have been different?
Aldo: In a way, yes. But in another way, how the government acts would have been the same. Maybe
the police force would not have been as detached. Again, there would have been similar resentments
towards the senators and congressmen since most of the political figures reside in Santiago, the capital,
and they are very detached from the situation which was happening in a more distant area.
Ricky: What exactly is the role of NGO in Chile? For example, in United States, when a disaster strikes,
people look at the central government first, and then organizations like the Red Cross.
Aldo: The primary role of the NGOs and the local community authority is to give consolation to the
community. “Un Techo” which is a government-funded project to the NGO was to provide temporary
housing to those suffering from disasters. However, there were controversies about the project since
some were trying to show off to continue getting funded from the government.
Ricky: So, where would the people go for help if the disaster struck again? NGOs or Government?
Aldo: Still NGO.
Ricky: What was the NGO’s first response to the earthquake?
Aldo: First thing was to take care of the families. Because it was such a big earthquake, people were
scattered all over the place, and locating them was the first priority. The two interviewees who were
here explained that they had to hop on a military van and the senator’s car to go around the
neighborhood. Remember that gas and electricity were down, so transportation was terribly difficult.
Ricky: Could you specify what you mean by “taking care” of the families?

Aldo: Checking families, checking general well-being of the people, making sure there is order. The 7th
Region office was destroyed while the 8th Region office was operating. Basically, Rodrigo [CEO of Vertical]
and Leonardo [Vice President of Vertical] were starting from the bottom of the country and going up
north. NGOs were the first response team, and due to the trust gained from the people, NGOs were
easier to navigate throughout the disaster than per say the government. The central government was
criticized heavily, especially Bachelet, for not calling the national military troops to support the
earthquake relief effort.
Ricky: I understand that NGOs’ first goal was to comfort people, but as far as lack of gasoline or
electricity, how did they deal with that?
Aldo: NGOs and various utility companies worked with the military to constantly supply resources from
nearby sources.
Ricky: Did you receive any help from Santiago or was it too far?
Aldo: There were some help from Santiago, but it was without us asking. To be quite honest, many
volunteers from Santiago actually added more to the problem than solving it. They were taking pictures
of the disaster, trying to take career opportunities from reconstruction projects, etc.
Ricky: When did the government actually kick in?
Aldo: About 2 weeks after the disaster. We only had help from the military and the police to keep
control of the population, and companies who were trying to rebuild infrastructure. It was similar to
how Bush reacted to Hurricane Katrina… political figures are rarely the first ones at the scene, but
almost always make bigger deal out of things to look good on tv.
Ricky: What was the hardest thing that the NGO faced?
Aldo: Communication. Having no cell phones provided extreme difficulty not only between the NGOs
and those who were volunteering, but to the people. Everybody wanted to talk to their relatives and
confirm that their families were okay. Because electricity was out and also the cell phone towers got
knocked out, regular cell phones were obsolete. We had special phones that used special motor
provided by the military but it would only work for a few hours. Every time we try to go help someone,
they were always requesting cell phones, so they can call their loved ones in other places.
Ricky: So if the cell phones issue was solved, would everything have been significantly better?
Aldo: Not necessarily. We were also worried about the people on the coastline since we haven’t had any
big tsunamis since 1960. Also, it was around the 60s when the new building codes were put in place and
regulated. Many of the structures around the country were built before that time, so we were worried
that those buildings might get easily destroyed.

Ricky: I used to live in Japan which is a country constantly experiencing earthquakes and tsunamis. The
building codes there are heavily regulated, and the population understands the risk of such disasters.
However, they suffered 15000 casualties while Chile only suffered 525. Why is that the case?
Aldo: The main difference is the tsunami. Their tsunami was one of a kind in 1000 years. Both of the
countries experienced similar earthquakes. In fact, Chile has a major earthquake almost every 10 years,
hitting different parts of the country since the country is so vertically long. We do extensive research on
earthquakes, and every children and adults understand the earthquake drill. However, tsunamis are
relatively new. I have done extensive research on earthquakes and tsunamis in Japan and Chile, and it
seems that there is a big tsunami every 1000 years to a particular country. There recent one that hit
Japan was their share, and our last one was around the 1500s. Because it’s not as apparent and we don’t
necessarily see it during our lifetime, we under-prepare for it. We were lucky that there were no big
tsunamis following the earthquake in 2010, especially given the fact that the national emergency agency
was closed during the time.
Ricky: How do you prepared for a tsunami?
Aldo: You just go up in elevation. 85 % of Chile is mountain, which ranks us as the most mountainous
region in the world, rivaling Switzerland. Therefore, we do not have any flat beaches. I guess educating
the people around the coast to react immediately to large earthquakes would be the key to survival.
Ricky: From the 525 people who died, what percentage was from tsunamis?
Aldo: 300 were from tsunamis and the rest were from falling debris. Most of them were not in Santiago.
Ricky: Were other countries affected at all?
Aldo: not at all. Chile is really the only one affected by earthquakes in South America. Argentina has
their one problem, which is volcano.
Ricky: What were the effects of the Earthquake? Since fatality rate was low and the stock exchange
barely dipped.
Aldo: 3000 schools were broken down, and 200,000 houses were broken down as well. However, most
schools were re-opened by April, and even before then, they found creative ways for everyone to
continue their education. There were other various difficulties. The government mandated to build
houses for those who lost their homes. However, many of them wanted to stay in their hometown,
especially since many of the houses were passed down from generations to generations. Some of them
didn’t have paper work nor did they sign the deed to the house when the ownership changed. So, we
had to send lawyers and psychologists to figure the situation out. Generally, those who were affected
the most were middle to lower class.
Ricky: What was the one single biggest key to earthquake prevention?

Aldo: Education. Educating the people about what to do during earthquakes. The older generation
remembers the big earthquake in 1960 which was 9.5 on the Richter scale, killing 125,000 people. So,
constantly reminding the new generations of what to do is important, and we have had programs to do
that.
Ricky: It’s interesting that Japanese stock index and the Indian stock exchange both dipped heavily
following respective tsunamis. However, Chile’s went up?
Aldo: Our economy went up actually because the earthquake and reconstruction created a lot of jobs,
and the aftermath of the earthquake – both financial aftermath and fatality rate – was better than
expected given the magnitude of the earthquake.
Ricky: Are most people insured?
Aldo: Yes, most have private property insurances. Also Health Insurances are common as well.
Ricky: What were some of the biggest hardships?
Aldo: The government was very detached from the situation, and could not relate to the people at all.
They were giving us things that we didn’t need, and not supplying commodities that we did need. Most
of the senators used the situations as a political spin, and even Bachelet told the entire world that we
did not need help, which in my opinion, was not the case at all. However, we did learn a lot from the
situation. We imposed stricter building codes, continue educating people about response techniques,
and created 24/7 national emergency response agency.
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